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“Always laugh when you can. 
It is cheap medicine.” 
Lord Byron 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims of the Dissertation 
The experience and expression of emotions is at the core of everyday life, cap-
turing, so to say, the beauty and pain of human life experience. In the context of 
the evolutionary framework that guides many approaches to emotions, they are 
considered regulatory mechanisms that developed to help us respond to the 
demands and opportunities of the social environment (Darwin, 1872). Emotions 
are characterized as temporary states of mind – relatively brief conscious expe-
riences of feelings such as pleasure and displeasure. According to the World 
Health Organisation (2006), emotions such as joy and anger normally motivate 
people in goal-directed behavior, having a significant impact on psychological 
well-being.  
The current research is aimed at understanding emotion processes and indi-
vidual differences in emotion recognition, emotion experience, and emotion 
expression. The main research question can be formulated as the following: To 
what extent are the experience, expression, and recognition of emotions affected 
by the personality traits and age of participants? The thesis presents five studies 
that are based on two experiments. In the first experiment (Studies I and II), 
individual differences in emotion recognition were analyzed. In the second 
experiment (Studies III, IV, and V), individual differences in the experience 
and expression of emotions were explored. 
Emotions are defined as relatively short episodic experiential processes that 
are biologically based and involve specific patterns of perception, experience, 
physiology, action, and communication, occur as a response to specific physical 
and societal challenges, and serve important adaptive functions (Keltner & 
Gross, 1999). Evaluation and monitoring of emotional states is essential in as-
sessing one’s mental health (Spielberger & Reheiser, 2009). During recent 
decades, research in the field of emotions has grown rapidly and some con-
sensus has been reached regarding the nature of emotions (Ekman, 2016).  
This research draws on several theoretical frameworks. These include em-
pathic accuracy model by William Ickes (1997, 2003), basic emotions theory by 
Paul Ekman (1992), affect variability concept (Eid & Diener, 1999), and the 
accessibility model of emotional self-report (Robinson & Clore, 2002). In the 
following sections, I review the relevant literature and then discuss the results of 
the experimental studies which comprise the current dissertation on the topics of 
mindreading, emotion recognition, retrospective ratings of experienced emo-
tions, affective variability, and the expression of anger. The terms ’emotions/ 
emotional’ and ’affect/affective’ are used interchangeably and refer to current 
emotional states.  
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The objectives of the studies of the current dissertation are as follows: 
 To explore the structure and dimensionality of self-reported mind-
reading beliefs (Study I); 
 To examine the relationship between general mindreading belief and 
performance in actual mindreading tasks (i.e., the recognition of emo-
tions expressed by face and speech, and the recognition of personality 
traits of a stranger), including the influence of personality traits and 
general intelligence (Study I); 
 To investigate age differences in recognizing facial and vocal emotion 
expression by using cross-sectional data covering the adult life span, 
and to examine for which emotions, between which age groups, and in 
which direction, the age differences emerge (Study II); 
 To explore the role of daily tiredness, age, and personality traits as sour-
ces of systematic bias in retrospective ratings of the momentary expe-
rience of four emotions: fear, sadness, anger, and happiness (Study III); 
 To examine whether affective variability predicts state- and trait-level 
tiredness, taking into account other possible influences (i.e., mean 
levels of emotions, personality traits) (Study IV);  
 To analyze how anger expression (anger-in vs. anger-out) is influenced 
by co-occurring emotions (fear, sadness, happiness, irritation, surprise, 
contempt, disgust, and disappointment), personality traits, and their 
interaction (Study V). 
 
 
1.2 Experience and Expression of Emotions 
1.2.1 The Concept of Emotions 
Despite decades of research in the field, there is ongoing scientific debate about 
the nature and expression of emotions. How do emotions shape our everyday 
living? What are the main factors behind individual differences in the emotional 
lives of people? These are some of the guiding questions behind research on 
individual differences in emotions. Furthermore, some basic questions about the 
nature of the links between personality traits and emotions have yet to be fully 
explored. How do emotions fit into the personality framework? What patterns of 
variability in emotions exist and how can we interpret emotional variability? 
What is the interplay between the experience and expression of emotions, on the 
one hand, and basic personality traits, on the other? To what extent can daily 
tiredness be explained by fluctuations in affect? The current thesis aims to find 
answers to these questions as a vital bridge between the theoretical concepts of 
emotions and personality through two experimental studies. 
Early theories of emotions were rather incomplete because they described 
only one aspect (e.g., physiology) or process (e.g., expression) of emotions. For 
example, according to William James (1884), emotion expressions were not the 
aftereffects of felt emotions, but the bodily reaction itself (e.g., smile) produced 
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the emotion (i.e., happiness). It is recognized in most current theoretical 
approaches that emotion is an umbrella term for a complex set of processes, 
which have many components. Most contemporary theories of emotion define 
emotions as processes, rather than states. Emotions are defined via a proto-
typical emotion episode consisting of different components: a cognitive (apprai-
sal), motivational (action tendency), somatic (physiological), motor (expres-
sion), and a feeling (subjective experience) component (Bossyt, Moors, & 
Houwer, 2014). Emotion is not an isolated episode, but a chain of events in-
volving a number of subsystems or components. One of these components, for 
example, is evaluation of the environment and the person–environment inter-
action. One of the basic premises of a group of theoretical approaches united 
under the title of appraisal theories is that emotions are adaptive responses 
which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that are significant for 
the organism’s well-being. The emotional process also includes a motivational 
component with action tendencies or other forms of action readiness, a compo-
nent with peripheral physiological responses, and a motor component with 
respective expressive behavior (Scherer, Schorr & Johnstone, 2001; Moors, 
Ellsworth, Scherer & Frijda, 2013). At the higher level of conceptualization, the 
emotion categories are perceived via more general dimensions of valence and 
arousal as most common underlying affective dimensions (see Fontaine, 
Scherer, & Soriano, 2013, for a review). In addition, also the categories of 
potency-control and unpredictability are added as necessary for differentiate 
between emotions and explain major sources of variation in emotion domain 
(Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007). It is argued that dimensional 
and categorical emotion frameworks are compatible with each other, and the 
classification of perceived emotions into discrete categories may rely on 
perception of more general dimensions (Izard, 2007; Mehu & Scherer, 2015). 
While emotion researchers have not yet reached agreement about the details, 
number, or exact sequence of the emotion process, they agree on the main prin-
ciples (Frijda, 2007; Moors, 2009). It is also argued that emotions differ from 
moods, as they have a short duration, high intensity, and are usually directed to 
a specific target (Moors, 2009).  
In a wider sense, this dissertation relies on affect program theory (see also 
Moors, 2009), which is based on the works of Ekman (1992), Izard (1977), and 
Panksepp (1998; 2000). The theory maintains that basic emotions have unique 
neural circuits that have evolved with a specific adaptive function, and these 
circuits are triggered when receiving specific input (stimulus), generating a spe-
cific action tendency, response, and emotional experience. The main evolutionary 
function of emotions is to activate a decision-making system, which also provides 
information about the significance of the stimulus that one is confronted with.  
Emotions are evolutionary determined in order to facilitate rapid judgements 
and behavioral choices, this claim is supported by findings that basic emotions 
are experienced, expressed, and also recognized in a same way across cultures 
(Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 2000). Emotions, which are considered to be basic or 
most fundamental are: happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, and anger, as 
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well as perhaps contempt (Ekman, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 2001). In order to 
demonstrate the innate nature of basic emotions, Matsumoto and Willingham 
(2006; 2009) studied the spontaneous expressions of blind athletes and found 
that the expressions of winners and losers were similar for sighted and blind 
competitors. This means that the production of facial expressions of emotion 
originate from an evolved response system.  
In addition, there is preliminary evidence that other emotions may also qua-
lify as basic emotions, including embarrassment (Keltner & Buswell, 1997) and 
pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Panksepp (1998, 2011) provided a different set 
of primal emotions, based on emotional circuitries. Basic emotions are argued 
to have a unique structure of components – i.e., facial expression (Ekman, 
1984), neural and physiological activation pattern (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Panksepp, 2000), appraisal pattern (Roseman, 1991), action 
tendency (Frijda, 1986), and experiential quality (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1987). Also, each emotional experience has a quantity (i.e., intensity) and a 
quality (i.e., a specific emotion, such as fear or anger) (Moors, 2009). 
It is argued that, in addition to basic emotions, there are also other more cog-
nitively complex, socially situated emotions, such as guilt, shame, embarrass-
ment, disappointment, and envy, that develop during socialization as a function 
of a blending of the basic emotions (Parkinson, Fisher, & Manstead, 2005). It is 
argued that these social and self-conscious emotions emerge when emotions are 
linked with cognitions and mixed with other emotions experienced in specific 
situations. For example, embarrassment is defined as fear together with 
appraised negative attention from others (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000). In the 
current thesis, disappointment and irritation are also included (Study V) as 
secondary emotions.  
There is still ongoing discussion over whether basic emotions have their own 
“fingerprints,” that is, distinctly recognizable physiological or expressional 
signatures (e.g., Barrett, 2017). It is argued that, rather than the emotions them-
selves, it is the component processes of emotions that are biologically based 
(Orthony & Turner, 1990). The main criticisms relate to evidence from cross-
cultural studies of facial expression recognition – it is argued that the use of 
forced-choice tasks may artificially boost the level of emotion recognition 
(Barrett, 2017; Russell, 1994). Barrett (2017) also shows that there is a great 
amount of variation both within and across people and cultures in the 
experience and expression of emotion. Recent research has also highlighted the 
importance of considering the influence of variability and individual differences 
in emotions as a function of personality (Montag & Panksepp, 2017). To sum 
up, there is considerable research evidence supporting the concept of basic 
emotions and non-basic, more social emotions, whereas the exact number and 
nature of both still differs according to theoretical perspective. There is growing 
interest in variability and individual differences in the experiencing and ex-
pressing of emotions. A better understanding of emotions in everyday contexts 
is tied to important life outcomes within the domains of welfare and health 
behavior (Bibby & Ferguson, 2011).  
13 
1.2.2 Social Communication of Emotions 
Emotions can also be viewed as social phenomena, where interpersonal inter-
actions are the basic stimuli for both emotional experiences and perception. The 
expression and recognition of emotions has been more the domain of social 
psychology, as the tasks involved rely on social communication. During an 
interaction, emotions are experienced and expressed, with simultaneous 
monitoring and interpreting of the emotions of others. Making inferences about 
others’ states, traits, attitudes, intentions, and other characteristics is one of the 
most ubiquitous activities of daily life, and, indeed, a cornerstone of social 
interactions. These inferences about other people may or may not be an accurate 
reflection of what the communication partner is really feeling or thinking. 
Accurate interpersonal understanding has been found to be related to relational 
well-being (Cohen, Schulz, Liu, Halassa, & Waldinger, 2015). Therefore, emo-
tion expression has a specific role in portraying and communicating the 
meaning of information in social interactions.  
Facial emotion expressions as non-verbal signals, have a major part in inter-
personal communication, together with spoken language. The recognition of 
facial emotions seems to be universal or near-universal across cultures and is 
also related to various psychiatric conditions, with decreased emotion re-
cognition skills being characteristic of autism, social phobia, borderline person-
ality disorder, and schizophrenia (van Dijke, van‘t Wout, Ford, & Aleman, 
2016). Patients with depression, furthermore, tend to have a negativity bias in 
assessing facial emotion expressions (Punkanen, Eerola, & Erkkilä, 2011). It 
has been demonstrated that emotion experience and facial expression are strong-
ly linked (Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2005). Facial movements that convey emotional meaning carry a range 
of information within social contexts, revealing details about what the commu-
nication partner is thinking and feeling. The scientific study of emotion expres-
sion dates back to the influential work of Darwin (1872/1998), who aimed to 
answer the question of how particular emotions are linked to specific facial 
morphology. He attributed the expression-emotion associations he found to 
adaptive and communicative functions for dealing with environmental prob-
lems. Contemporary research suggests that discrete facial expressions of 
emotion (1) are linked with internal states; (2) occur universally across emotion-
eliciting situations; (3) are rated universally and discretely; (4) have important 
social functions; and (5) co-vary with other parts of the emotion system, such as 
physiological processes and specific actions (Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, 
O’Sullivan, & Frank, 2008). Similar to research in facial emotion expressions, 
there is also a solid amount of evidence indicating that specific vocal acoustic 
features are associated with the expression of emotions, and listeners can 
reliably interpret emotion-related arousal from vocal expressions (Scherer 1986, 
1989, 2003; Banse & Scherer, 1996; see review by Johnstone & Scherer, 2000). 
This means that there is a clear link between a particular internal emotional state 
and the vocal communicative display of acoustic cues. The mean identification 
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rate of intended emotions is approximately 55%, being highest for anger, fear, 
sadness, and happiness (see a review by Johnstone & Scherer, 2000). It is 
argued that the primary functions of vocal emotion expressions are not just the 
signaling of the experience, but also influencing the listener’s emotions and 
behavior (Bachorowski & Owren, 2008; Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernandez-
Dols, 2003). Thus, vocal expressions of emotion can be seen as important tools 
for communication as well as social influence. 
Emotional experience often unfolds as a reaction to the actions of other 
people, which usually also have an impact at the interpersonal level – someone 
does something that offends you and, as a result, you get angry, you react 
angrily, and the other person gets angry in return. Thus, although emotions are 
considered to be private intrapsychic experiences, they are also evidently con-
nected to interpersonal processes. Other people affect our emotions, and are, in 
turn, affected by these themselves – emotions, thus, function both as causes and 
effects. It is argued that the key function of experienced emotions is to contri-
bute toward interpersonal effect, being a part of the continual analyzing of 
social relations (Parkinson, 1995, 1996). For example, sadness leads to a 
seeking of social support, whereas anger draws attention to an unfairness in 
social relationships that needs to be changed for the sake of individual well-
being.  
The recognition and regulation of emotions have also been considered as an 
interactive skill components within the broader context of emotional and social 
competence (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). Emotional competence is defined as 
the capacity to respond emotionally in order to accomplish adaptive goals in 
social situations that provoke emotions (Saarni, 1999; Thompson, 1994). Emo-
tional processes are argued to serve motivational, communicative, and regu-
latory functions in developing social competence in order to successfully navi-
gate one’s emotionality in social situations (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). The 
control and regulation of one’s emotions, as well as the emotions of others, have 
also been argued to form a part of the general factor of emotional intelligence, 
with emotion perception as a lower-level skill and emotion management as a 
higher-level process (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer, Salovey & 
Caruso 2000). Those who possess greater emotional intelligence are argued to 
monitor and regulate both positive and negative emotions in order to reach their 
desired social outcomes. Thus, emotionally intelligent behavior refers to the 
recognition and regulation of emotions using internal and external cues in 
accordance with behavioral, experiential, and physiological response tendencies 
(Barrett & Gross, 2001). There is an ongoing debate on whether internal feed-
back from postural and gestural movements induced by external stimuli pro-
duces the corresponding emotional experience. This idea dates back to James’s 
theory (1884) suggesting that bodily changes lead to the experience of emotion, 
meaning that a posed smile, for example, induces a feeling of happiness. In a 
similar way, Neumann and Starck (2000) found that listening to a happy or sad 
voice induces the corresponding emotions, without the need to physically mimic 
the sound. However, a recent replication study failed to find evidence that 
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producing a facial expression results in measurable changes in emotion states 
(Wagenmakers et al., 2016). Thus, although the facial feedback hypothesis is 
frequently presented in textbooks as a key point of connection between emotion 
expression and experience, there are methodological difficulties in measuring 
the effect of the phenomenon. Furthermore, in real life, there is additional con-
textual information that also influences the emotion contagion between commu-
nication partners (i.e., exposure to a shared situation). One is happier when 
smiling because the communication partner usually smiles back: this inter-
pretation, together with the intrapsychic state, leads to shared emotions in social 
communication.  
During the emotion communication process, emotion encoding and decoding 
take place (Noller, 2006). Encoding involves the expression of experienced 
emotions, whereas decoding involves the detection of emotions expressed by 
the communication partner. The study of experience and expression of emotions 
is by necessity interdisciplinary, and although during the last decades important 
progress has been made in understanding the emotion processes, a number of 
aspects about emotion experience and communication remain unclear. The first, 
which is addressed by the current thesis, pertains to encoding – how is emotion 
expression (in case of anger) influenced by the interaction between momentary 
co-occurring emotions and underlying personality traits? Other questions, also 
addressed in current thesis, pertain to decoding – how accurate are people at 
assessing their emotion decoding ability (i.e., mindreading), which individual 
differences (i.e., personality, age) affect the emotion recognition accuracy? 
Understanding individual differences in emotion processes provides further 
evidence about the way we experience, perceive, express, and remember 
emotions. 
 
 
1.2.3 Individual Differences in the Experience, Expression, and 
Recognition of Emotions 
There is growing interest in the relationship between emotions and personality, 
which has led to integration in emotion and personality research (Allik & Realo, 
1997). The extent to which certain stimuli actually elicit particular emotions 
may strongly depend on personality as well as situational factors. Both emotion 
and personality research aim to explain psychological differences across indi-
viduals and situations. One focal area is individual differences in the recogni-
tion, experience, and expression of emotions, and the degree to which these 
differences can be explained by personality traits. Reisenzein and Weber (2009) 
consider the emotion system to be a subsystem or component of personality that 
exists in some form in nearly all personality taxonomies. According to the Five-
Factor Model of personality, there are five basic and relatively independent 
personality traits, usually labeled as Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to 
experience (Openness), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (McCrae & 
Costa, 1999). Four of these (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and 
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Openness) have been suggested to be related to emotional dispositions of the 
individual (Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002; Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988). Neuroticism is considered the propensity to experience nega-
tive emotions; Extraversion entails a tendency toward positive affect; Agree-
ableness includes a friendly emotional disposition toward other people (i.e., 
being less anger-prone and more empathic); and Openness entails a capacity to 
experience esthetic feelings (Reisenzein & Weber, 2009). The goal of the 
present thesis is to shed light on these topics in order to provide new insight and 
build a better foundation for future research examining the relationship between 
personality traits and emotions. 
 
1.3 Mindreading and emotion recognition 
People seek to understand the psychological characteristics (i.e., emotional 
states, personality traits, abilities, etc.) of others during the social process of 
getting to know one another. Empathy in a wider sense means understanding 
and responding to the mental states of others (Blair, 2005). Empathic accuracy 
is defined as the perceiver’s ability to correctly identify the states and traits of 
other people (Ickes, 1997), and can be considered an indicator of social 
competence (Stump, Ratliff, Wu & Hawley, 2009). It is argued that the accurate 
perception of states (i.e., current feelings and behavioral goals) is necessary for 
the accurate perception of enduring dispositions (Ickes, 1993). Although accu-
rate judgment of communication partners is critical to social interaction, there is 
evidence that people are not good at assessing their own ability to understand 
others. For example, a study by Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, and Garcia (1990) 
demonstrated a lack of metaknowledge about empathic accuracy, measured 
using the dyadic interaction paradigm, in that correlations between self-reported 
empathy and empathic skills were missing or negative. The research on em-
pathic accuracy has mainly operationalized this as a correspondence between 
what targets report expressing and what perceivers infer (Ickes et al., 1990) in 
an attempt to understand what kind of informational cues from targets (i.e., 
facial expression or semantic information) and what dispositions of perceivers 
affect the accuracy of judgments.  
The main purpose of Study I was to explore the link between self-reported 
mindreading ability and actual performance in emotion recognition tasks as an 
indicator of empathic accuracy skills. Previous research has suggested that 
people are highly attentive to their abilities and think that they have quite a 
realistic sense of their strengths and weaknesses (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
Still, there is a body of literature reporting that people have rather poor insight 
into their own skills and abilities: when self-assessment is compared with real 
performance, there is only a modest correlation between perception and reality 
(Cricher & Dunning, 2009; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Mabe & West, 
1982). It has been shown that self-views about specific task performance are 
most strongly influenced by more global self-views (i.e., self-esteem) (Ehrlinger 
& Dunning, 2003).  
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Recognition of the emotions of a communication partner is a basic building 
block of social competence, and it has been shown that discrimination of facial 
displays of different emotions takes place quickly (Tracy & Robins, 2008), with 
special vigilance for perceiving potentially threatening and angry emotions in 
others (Blagrove & Watson, 2010; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Hansen 
& Hansen, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Thus, in general, humans are usually 
skilled in emotion recognition. In Study I, the structure of self-rated mind-
reading ability was explored – whether self-rated competence in judging another 
person’s personality belongs to the same category as his or her opinion about 
the ability to read another person’s thoughts and emotions. It has been argued 
that personality is revealed through social behavior and can thus be readily 
understood by other people (Funder & Colvin, 1997). In addition, mindreading 
accuracy is conceptualized as the ability to infer someone’s mental state (e.g., 
emotions), behavior, roles, and identity (Davis & Kraus, 1997). The ability to 
recognize facial and vocal expressions of emotions has firm scientific evidence 
(Ekman, 1994), and more recent studies have extended this line of research, 
suggesting that the ability to recognize human emotions can also be applied to 
domesticated animals (Albuquerque, Guo, Wilkinson, Savalli, Otta, & Mills, 
2016). Thus, the ability to make inferences about the emotions of a commu-
nication partner has strong evolutionary roots (Darwin, 1872). In addition to 
mindreading abilities, people possess the skill and habit of metacognition – 
defined as awareness and monitoring of one’s thoughts and task performance 
(Flavell, 1979). In order to explore the structure of self-rated mindreading 
abilities, a Mind-Reading Belief Scale (MBS) was created and validated in a 
group of 1,802 participants. It was demonstrated, in Study I, that self-assess-
ment of four thematically organized groups of mindreading beliefs – the ability 
to infer others’ (1) personality traits, (2) mental states, (3) roles, identity, and 
status, and (4) future behavior – concentrate around one single generalized 
belief. As a result, the final MBS scale was developed, consisting of 8 items. 
Next, the relationship between mindreading belief and actual mindreading 
performance was explored. The results provided further evidence that self-
reported measurements of mindreading skills are not closely related to actual 
mindreading skills. This also means that the hugely popular concept of emotio-
nal intelligence is more elusive than was originally thought (cf. Davies, Stan-
kov, & Roberts, 1998). Thus, Study I made an important contribution to the 
mounting evidence that people lack insight into their mindreading abilities, 
which also imposes significant limitations on the popular construct of emotional 
intelligence.  
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1.4 Age and emotion recognition 
Previous studies have found a specific deficit in the facial judgment accuracy of 
negative emotions at advanced ages (Calder et al., 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 2007; 
McDowell, Harrison, & Demaree, 1994; Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz, & Alpert, 
1993; Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 2002; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phil-
lips, 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Suzuki, Hoshino, Shigemasu, & Kawa-
mura, 2007), contradictory to the widespread belief that overall emotional com-
petence improves with age as a result of life-experience. It is suggested that 
certain negative emotions such as fear, sadness (Calder et al., 2003; Keightley et 
al., 2006; Orgeta & Phillips, 2008; Ruffman et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2005), 
and anger (Calder et al., 2003; Orgeta & Phillips, 2008; Phillips et al., 2002; 
Ruffman et al., 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; Wong et al., 2005) are recog-
nized more poorly by older people. On the other hand, for the recognition of 
facial displays of happiness and surprise, there is evidence of age-equivalence 
(Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2010; Orgeta & Phillips, 2008; Phillips et al., 2002; Sulli-
van & Ruffman, 2004), or even age-advantage (Murphy, Lehrfeld, & Isaacowitz, 
2010). Beyond facial expressions, older adults have also been found to be less 
accurate at identifying emotional vocal expressions (Brosgole & Weisman, 1995; 
Paulmann, Pell, & Kotz, 2008; Ryan, Murray, & Ruffman, 2010).  
The aim of Study II was to examine for which emotions, between which age 
groups, and in which direction age-differences in emotion recognition emerge, 
as well as identify the role of the personality traits of the perceiver. The most 
distinctive age-related difference was found for a group of negative emotions, 
sadness in particular, but also anger, to a lesser degree. In addition, it was 
demonstrated that the first differences in emotion recognition already emerge in 
a person’s 30s. An analysis of the pattern of errors made during a forced-choice 
task of emotion recognition revealed that, although older age groups made more 
mistakes, the structure of response patterns does not differ between age groups. 
Thus, confusion matrices did not show a preference for positive or neutral 
response choices in older adults. Importantly, it was also demonstrated that the 
Big Five personality traits do not mediate emotion recognition accuracy, but 
Openness and Conscientiousness make an independent contribution – thus, 
people who are more determined to achieve their objectives and people who are 
more unconventional in their thinking are also better at detecting cues of emo-
tions. The main conclusion of Study II was that trajectories of cross-sectional 
age-differences in emotion recognition accuracy differ among emotions: while 
recognition of facial contempt increased until 60 years of age, recognition of 
sadness and anger decreased progressively across age groups.  
There are several reasons suggested for this age effect, based on expla-
nations related to changes in the brain or to motivation, general cognitive 
decline, different gaze patterns, and methodological limitations.  
The brain-based explanation suggests that structural and functional changes 
in the neural substrates are behind this age-related decline in emotion re-
cognition (Adolphs & Tranel, 2004; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & 
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Matsumura, 2004). There is initial evidence that distinct neural components 
might be related to specific emotions, irrespective of modality; the hippo-
campus, for example, is activated when recognizing anger and fear (Britton, 
Taylor, Sudheimer, & Liberzon, 2006). Age differences in recognizing negative 
emotions have also been explained via motivational changes accompanying 
advancing age, as suggested by socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Socioemotional selectivity theory argues that 
prioritization of positive emotional goals leads to an age-related positivity 
effect, meaning that older adults prefer positive information and, thus, ignore 
negative emotions. The results of Study II do not seem to support socioemotio-
nal selectivity theory, as a shift toward more a positive outlook by preferring 
neutral or positive answers was not found. However, Isaacowitz and Stanley 
(2011) point out that most of the studies about the link between emotion recog-
nition and age are rather descriptive in nature.  
One mechanism suggested to lie behind the age-related emotion recognition 
decline is general age-related cognitive decline, which is also reflected in slower 
reaction times, declines in executive functioning, and other domains (Bäckman, 
Small, & Wahlin, 2001; Salthouse, 1996). As suggested in Study II, there is no 
evidence that the recognition of sadness or anger, either in the vocal or facial 
domain, is a more complicated cognitive task than the recognition of fear or 
disgust. Studies have yielded inconsistent findings, but the general conclusion is 
that age-related cognitive changes cannot fully account for age differences in 
emotion recognition (Keightley et al., 2006; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b), but are 
nevertheless significant in explaining the age-related decline in recognizing spe-
cific emotions, for example sadness (MacPherson, Phillips, & Delia Sala, 2002).  
Studies using observational eye tracking have suggested that older adults 
make errors in facial emotion recognition by focusing too little on the top half 
of faces, with more gaze fixation on the mouth region (Wong et al., 2005; Sulli-
van et al., 2007). When recognizing facial emotion displays, the top of the face 
is more important for identifying sadness, fear, and anger, whereas the lower 
half of the face is an important indicator of disgust and happiness (Calder, 
Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000). Again, age differences in gaze patterns when 
looking at faces cannot fully account for differences in facial emotion recog-
nition accuracy (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2010).  
Isaacowitz and Stanley (2011) argue that the documented age-related decline 
in emotion recognition might not reflect the social competence of older adults in 
everyday social relationships due to methodological limitations, as emotion 
recognition tasks to date may not measure the mechanisms used in real-life 
settings. On the other hand, a recent study by Schlegel and colleagues (2017) 
also reported age differences by using more ecologically valid emotion recog-
nition test containing dynamic and multimodal emotion portrayals. Thus, 
although there is consensus that age-related differences in emotion recognition 
exist, the mechanisms behind this effect are not yet clearly delineated, parti-
cularly in relation to the transaction between the target, perceiver, and the 
associated cues.  
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1.5 Retrospective emotion ratings and personality 
Reflecting on one’s previously experienced emotions is important in making 
sense of one’s life (Thomas & Diener, 1990). Memories about experienced 
emotions are integral to one’s life-experience as well as in daily life – affect 
recall has a significant impact on one’s behavior by guiding decision-making 
and planning (Fredrickson, 2000; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009; Robinson & 
Clore, 2002). It has been shown that emotionally arousing events are stored 
more strongly in memory (Kensinger, 2004). Although both scientific research 
and clinical assessment of experienced affect often relies on retrospective emo-
tion ratings, little is known about how these deviate from momentary assess-
ments, and what the role of personality traits in this assessment is. I now, there-
fore, turn to the question of how personality traits may influence emotional 
retrospection.  
Retrospective reports can be expected to be influenced by general affective 
tendencies arising from one’s personality traits, as previous research has found 
that people tend to exaggerate past emotional experiences (Hedges, Jandorf, & 
Stone, 1985; Kardum & Daskijević, 2001; Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds, & 
Totterdell, 1995; Thomas & Diener, 1990; Wirtz et al., 2003). Robinson and 
Clore (2002) explain this discrepancy between concurrent and retrospective 
affect by the need to mentally reconstruct the times when respective emotions 
were experienced. In addition, it is suggested that the retrospective exaggeration 
of emotional experiences may have adaptive value (Schwarz, 2007; Levine et al., 
2009). Affective experiences tend to fade over time, and turn from episodic 
memories into semantic knowledge, as suggested by Robinson and Clore (2002).  
The Big Five personality traits, especially Neuroticism and Extraversion, 
have been shown to be related to general negative and positive affectivity, 
respectively (Watson & Clark, 1992). The nature of Neuroticism is high stress-
reactivity and proneness to negative emotions such as anxiety and worry, and 
Extraversion can be seen as a tendency to feel energetic and sociable, with high 
positive arousal (Costa & McCrae, 1989; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). 
Thus, it can be expected that a person with typical attributes of someone high in 
Neuroticism may recall more negative affect when thinking about emotional 
events experienced in the past.  
The main aim of Study III was to explore the individual differences in 
systematic biases in the retrospective vs. momentary emotion ratings of sadness, 
fear, happiness, and anger. The study was based on experience sampling data 
gathered across two weeks on 7 randomly determined occasions per day. The 
results indicated that age and daily tiredness impact the retrospective emotion 
ratings given to experienced emotions at the end of the day. More long-term 
retrospective ratings of experienced emotions are influenced by the Big Five 
personality traits. The results support the Accessibility Model of Emotional 
Self-Report (Robinson & Clore, 2002), which differentiates between levels of 
remembering one’s emotions, based on the accessibility principle of amount of 
time passed (i.e., one day vs. weeks), arguing that short-term judgments are 
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influenced more by episodic memory biases, such as current affective state, 
whereas longer-term judgments are influenced more by semantic knowledge 
(beliefs about self and one’s personality traits). Study III demonstrated, 
through experience sampling data, that Neuroticism is linked to retrospective 
exaggeration of negative affect, and Extraversion is linked to retrospective 
exaggeration of positive affect. To date, only two studies, limited to university 
samples, have investigated the associations between personality traits and retro-
spective emotion reports (Barrett, 1997; Safer & Keuler, 2002). In addition, 
Study III also investigated the personality associations with momentary-retro-
spective report discrepancies by using specific emotion items, whereas previous 
studies have used broader positive and negative affect categories (Barrett, 1997; 
Safer & Keuler, 2002). More recently, Lay and colleagues (2016) also demon-
strated the retrospective emotion exaggeration effects of Neuroticism and 
Extraversion by distinguishing between high and low arousal affect. Previous 
studies have relied on just one retrospective report per participant (Barrett, 
1997; Hedges et al., 1985; Kahneman, 2000; Parkinson et al., 1995; Safer & 
Keuler, 2002). Study III, however, used repeated daily assessments over a 
period 14 days to capture the time course of memory of experienced emotions 
by comparing one day with two week assessments. Personality associations 
with memories about emotional experiences were stronger for the longer recall 
period. Robinson and Clore (2002) suggest that, as time passes, memories about 
specific affective experiences become based more on general self-knowledge to 
compensate for the fading of memories. Thus, personality links with memories 
about emotional experiences tend to be stronger when individuals are retrieving 
emotions over a longer period. The negative association between Neuroticism 
and a retrospective exaggeration of fear and sadness, and the link between 
Extraversion and a retrospective enhancement of the feeling of happiness as 
reported in Study III have been supported by a more recent study by Lay and 
colleagues (2016). This suggests that differences in personality traits also 
express themselves in the way people see their past emotional experiences. In 
addition, discrepancies between retrospective and concurrent reports can be 
partly explained by personality differences. Study III provided further evidence 
about the link between tiredness and affective experiences, by demonstrating 
that tiredness felt at the end of the day leads to an enhancement of the negative 
emotions of fear, sadness, and anger, and a reduction in happiness. Study III 
also demonstrated that the age-related positivity effect in emotion experience 
(Carstensen et al., 2011) could be partially explained by a retrospective 
reduction in the intensity of experienced emotions by way of a reactive emotion 
regulation mechanism. Taken together, the results of Study III provided further 
evidence that people with high Neuroticism have a bias toward the retrieval of 
negative emotions, whereas people high in Extraversion are more likely to 
retrieve more emotions that are positive. It is argued that retrospective emotion 
reports reveal more about personality and belief structures than concurrent 
affect reports (Robinson & Clore, 2002). However, despite the reported 
discrepancies, retrospective reports of emotions experienced in the past are still 
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quite accurate, as has also been concluded in other studies (Lay, et al., 2016; 
Kardum & Daskijević, 2001). Emotional memories are important; they shape 
future behaviors and choices about aims that are worth pursuing and those that 
are better to avoid. Personality traits have a significant role to play in the pro-
cess of reconstructing emotional experiences. In general, emotionally meaning-
ful experiences are central to one’s identity and self-knowledge. 
 
1.6 Emotional Variability 
During last decades, the study of intraindividual variability has made significant 
contribution to understand behavior in a wide variety of domains. For example, 
heart rate variability (HRV) has been found to be related to different aspects of 
well-being and social cognition, people with higher HRV are more accurate in 
emotion recognition tasks, whereas reduced HRV is associated with psychiatric 
disorders, alcohol dependence, and several somatic diseases like chronic pain 
(Geisler, Vennevald, Kubiak, & Weber, 2010; Kemp, Quintana, Kuhnert, Grif-
fiths, Hickie, & Guastella, 2012; Quintana, Guastella, Outhred, Hickie, & 
Kemp, 2012; Tracy et al., 2016.). Within-person variability in affect is an area 
of growing attention in empirical investigation (Barrett, 2017). It is important to 
understand which changes are more likely to take place in experienced emotions 
due to personality qualities and other person-related variables (e.g., age), and 
which changes take place as a response to idiosyncratic events, i.e., how and 
why people differ in these fluctuations. Variations in the intensity and duration 
of emotional experiences provide important information about a person’s 
mental health and wellbeing. It has been found that recognizing and under-
standing one’s feelings can help individuals cope more effectively with their 
emotional experiences (Pond et al., 2012), whereas the ability to regulate one’s 
emotions by suppressing or enhancing emotion expression predicts lesser 
distress in the longer term (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 
2004). On the other hand, higher intra-individual variability in negative emo-
tions has been found to be related to higher distress, depression, and poorer 
physical health, both concurrently and prospectively (Eid & Diener, 1999; Kup-
pens, Van Mechelen, Nezlek, Dossche, & Timmermans, 2007; Ram, Gerstorf, 
Lindenberger, & Smith, 2009). Higher variability in negative emotions has also 
been found to be a stable individual difference characteristic over periods from 
months to years (Eid & Diener, 1999; Hardy & Segerstom, 2016; Röcke, Li, & 
Smith, 2009). In addition, higher variability in happiness has been linked to 
higher psychological distress, but only during the concurrent life period 
(Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, & Mauss, 2013; Hardy & Segerstom, 2016). 
Higher variability in affect has been linked to higher Neuroticism, and lower 
Agreeableness and Extraversion (Kuppens et al., 2007; Timmermans, Van 
Mechelen, & Kuppens, 2010). Higher Openness has also been associated with 
higher affective variability (Velting & Liebert, 1997). Wilson, Thompson, and 
Vazire (2016) found that within-person variance in personality traits is mostly 
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affected by fluctuations in positive and negative affect, and for some personality 
traits, situational variables also have a significant impact. Ching et al. (2014) 
found positive affect to co-vary positively with Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Openness, and Conscientiousness, and negatively with Neuroticism, whereas 
negative affect co-varied positively with Neuroticism and negatively with 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The emotional experien-
ces of older people have been found to be less variable across time (Röcke, Li, 
& Smith, 2009), especially in regard to negative emotions (Chow, Hamagani, & 
Nesselroade, 2007).  
Daily tiredness is a common phenomenon and refers to a physical or mental 
state developed as a response to life strain, when one feels the need for rest or 
sleep. It is reported that people may feel the presence of tiredness up to a 67% 
of time (Schneider & Stone, 2014). Tiredness is also conceptualized as an 
indicator o the energetic arousal dimension, being one of three basic dimensions 
of mood (Wilhelm & Schoebi, 2007). There are several indicators of life quality 
linked to tiredness. For example, life satisfaction experienced during the day is 
influenced by sleep quality and tiredness, among other factors (Kahneman, 
Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Perkinson-Gloor, Lemola, & Grob, 
2013). However, there is a need for studies using an experimental design in 
order to understand state- and trait-level tiredness (Lievesley, Rimes & Chalder, 
2014). Studies of affective variability have used different ranges of time points, 
with some measurements of up to 50, but the majority of studies employing 5-
10, measurement occasions (Eid & Diener, 1999; Kuppens et al., 2007; Ram, et 
al., 2011; Hardy & Segerstom, 2016). Within-person trait variability has been 
argued to reflect the dynamics of social-cognitive processes in engaging with 
various contexts (e.g., mood, goals, and roles) (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). 
The main aim of Study IV was to explore the association between intraindi-
vidual variability in emotions and daily tiredness. More specifically, Study IV 
explored tiredness both at state and trait levels, with the purpose of clarifying 
the role of momentary feelings of tiredness in long-term tiredness ratings, and 
included different momentary (e.g., emotional variability, mean levels of emo-
tions) and trait-level (e.g., personality traits, age) moderating variables. The 
results of Study IV demonstrated that intraindividual variability in emotions is 
relatively stable across time and situations, and plays an important role in pre-
dicting subjective feeling of tiredness. The results of Study IV also demon-
strated that emotional variability is a homogeneous characteristic across emo-
tion categories, meaning that when one’s happiness fluctuates greatly across 
time, it is reasonable to assume that the pattern of variability is similar for other 
emotions. Also, emotional variability was found to be quite stable over a period 
of two weeks, suggesting that the tendency to experience emotions at very diffe-
rent levels of intensity vs. experiencing them in quite a consistent manner, can 
be considered a stable individual difference characteristic. People often expect 
that achieving a more predictable life will result in predictable emotional states – 
Study IV, however, suggests that emotional experiences tend to be the same 
over several weeks, and variability over even longer periods of time is an 
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important subject for further studies. One of the most important findings of 
Study IV was that a significant amount of tiredness can be explained by mean 
emotional states and emotional variability. The more emotions fluctuate over 
time, the more tiredness is felt momentarily as well as over longer time periods.  
Trait-level factors also influence the experience of tiredness, with people 
high in Openness reporting less, and more extraverted people more, momentary 
tiredness. On the other hand, over longer time periods, more neurotic and more 
agreeable people report more tiredness, and more conscientious people less 
tiredness. In addition, there is an interaction between emotional variability and 
personality traits in predicting tiredness, meaning that the influence of 
emotional variability on tiredness depends on personality traits. Regarding the 
link between tiredness and age, it was found that, on average, older people are 
less tired, but, when reporting more emotional variability, older people also tend 
to report more tiredness. This suggests that superior emotional well-being in 
older adults is achieved by a reduced exposure to stressful events. Study IV 
made a significant contribution to the literature about associations between 
personality traits and state-level emotional experiences, as previous research 
had largely focused on the links between Extraversion and positive affect, and 
Neuroticism and negative affect.  
Taken together, the results of Study IV made a contribution to the literature 
about the connection between tiredness and emotional variability, demon-
strating that emotional variability is a separate predictor of the feeling of tired-
ness.  
 
1.7 The importance of co-occurring emotions and 
personality traits in anger expression 
People use a broad range of emotion regulation strategies to modulate their 
emotion expressions in order to work toward their short- and long-term goals 
(Gross, 2002; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Tamir, 2011). Research on anger has 
distinguished between two coping styles: anger-out (showing overt anger 
expression) and anger-in (suppressing overt anger expression) (Spielberger, 
1999). This means that emotional reactions can be regulated in order to magnify 
or minimize the emotional loading of the situation. Expressing anger may serve 
different communicative effects, depending on the context and its significance. 
A person can express anger as an antagonistic reaction to show that he or she 
deserves more respect and to restore social status. There is evidence that social 
sharing reduces the intensity of experienced anger (Brans, van Mechelen, Rimé, 
& Verdyn, 2014; Frattaroli, 2006). However, depending on the situation, repa-
ratory communicative behavior may mean the suppression of anger so as not to 
damage social status (Parkinson et al., 2005). The majority of researchers em-
phasize the role of a subjective appraisal of the situation as the most important 
factor in the elicitation of an emotion (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Frijda, 1988; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Anger involves clear inter-
25 
personal factors, such as the action tendencies of antagonism or retaliation – the 
feeling of injustice is frequently accompanied by revenge motivation. If some-
one has insulted us by doing (or not doing) something, the initial reaction is to 
do it back somehow. But anger can also rise as a result of simple physical or 
social resistance, without any blame appraisals – this explains why anger is 
frequently directed at non-human subjects (Parkinson et al., 2005). Thus, both 
the experience and expression of anger depend on the intrapsychic as well as 
interpersonal context. Barret (2017) stresses the need to consider the great 
amount of variability even in the facial expressions of anger. In real-life situa-
tions, feelings are frequently experienced in a mixed way (Berrios, Totterdell & 
Kellett, 2015). The precise characteristics of each anger episode – how it 
evolves, when and how it is expressed – depend on both individual (i.e., perso-
nality) and situational factors (i.e., the status and group membership of the 
person one is angry with and the apparent reason for the angry feelings). Pre-
vious studies have shown that differentiating one’s current affect into discrete 
categories by answering the question “what emotions are these that I feel right 
now?”, reduces anger expression (Pond, et al., 2012).  
It can be expected that trait-level dispositions direct the way state-level 
emotions influence behavior.  Study V focuses on individual differences in the 
situational regulation of anger expression. Specifically, the role of co-occurring 
emotions in influencing anger expression, together with the interactive effects 
of the Big Five personality traits, was explored. In Study V, everyday anger ex-
pression was conceptualized as anger-in and anger-out reactions to experiencing 
the feeling of anger.  
Anger-in behavior is also defined as the suppression of the anger experience. 
Gross (1998) defines expressive suppression as a response-focused emotion 
regulation strategy that targets only the behavioral component (e.g., expression). 
Expressive suppression is thus an attempt to hide the overt expression of an 
emotion without changing the event or appraisal behind the experience of a 
particular emotion (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 
1997). Expressive suppression as an emotion regulation strategy interferes 
directly with the signaling of a person’s inner state to a communication partner, 
in order to attain her or his social goals (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011; 
McRae, Heller, John & Gross, 2011; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Russell, 
Bachorowski, & Fernandéz-Dols, 2003). Although widely used in everyday life, 
the expressive suppression of emotions is associated with a broad range of nega-
tive psychological and social outcomes, such as decreased well-being and social 
support, and reduced intimacy and warmth in close relationships for the indi-
viduals themselves as well as their interaction partners (Butler et al., 2003; 
English & John, 2013; Gross & John, 2003; Impett et al., 2012; Srivastava, 
Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009; Tackman & Srivastava, 2016). The 
reason for the negative consequences of expression suppression is the in-
congruence in the emotion processes in how one feels vs. what one expresses 
(English & John, 2013). However, in some situations, emotion suppression may 
be adaptive for well-being (Bonanno et al., 2004; Le & Impett, 2013).  
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Campos and colleagues (2011) have stressed the need to measure emotion 
regulation processes in the context of actual social interaction. It has been found 
that the use of emotion suppression is quite variable across time, as people 
differ as much from themselves as they differ from each other in their use of 
emotion suppression (Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008). Thus, people differ from each 
other on their number of average emotion suppression incidents, and their use of 
emotion suppression episodes differs from their own average use of emotion 
suppression across situations. The use of emotion suppression has been linked 
to trait Extraversion, suggesting that more outgoing, energetic, enthusiastic and 
assertive people are less inhibited in emotion expression (Gross & John, 2003; 
English & John, 2013).  
The results of Study V showed that the experience of anger is frequently ac-
companied by the simultaneous co-occurrence of other emotions, and the 
suppression of the experience of anger is buffered by sadness, surprise, disgust, 
disappointment, and irritation. Showing one’s anger out is influenced by co-
occurring fear, sadness, and disappointment.   
We were also interested in the specific interaction patterns between perso-
nality traits and co-occurring emotions. The results of Study V indicated that 
there are particular interactive effects between the Big Five personality traits 
and specific emotions. It was revealed that, when anger is accompanied by 
surprise, less open people hold their anger back more, whereas more open 
people express anger more overtly. When anger is accompanied by disgust, less 
conscientious people do not suppress their anger. In addition, Conscientiousness 
significantly influences the way people deal with anger when it is accompanied 
by contempt. Contempt is an emotion that reflects a feeling of superiority over 
another person and emerges in situations of jealousy, greed, and rivalry (Izard, 
1991). Thus, people who are very goal-focused (i.e., high Conscientiousness) 
tend to mask their contempt when felt together with anger, as these two 
emotions together have the potential to seriously harm social relations. People 
high in Neuroticism hold anger back less when it is accompanied by disgust, 
surprise, or irritation, whereas anger is expressed more when accompanied by 
contempt. The influence of Conscientiousness and co-occurring sadness has a 
similar influence on anger behavior. Thus, high Conscientiousness has an 
influence on anger behavior when anger is accompanied by disgust, contempt, 
or sadness. Neuroticism has an interaction with irritation; as can be expected, 
people higher in Neuroticism suppress anger less when they are also irritated, 
surprised, or disgusted at that moment. There are some similarities and some 
differences when the overt expression of anger is analyzed. Conscientiousness, 
again, displays different interactions with co-occurring emotions: people high in 
Conscientiousness display less anger when it is accompanied by irritation or 
disgust. The higher the Conscientiousness, the less the anger expression is 
influenced by the co-occurring irritation. Thus, Conscientiousness seems to 
allow better self-control in situations of anger and irritation. However, co-
occurring disgust does not influence the behavior of people high in Con-
scientiousness, but makes less conscientious people express more anger. The 
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picture is different for Extraversion: the more extraverted one is, the more a co-
occurring feeling of disgust will result in an expression of feelings of anger. Co-
occurring contempt also makes more open people show less anger out, while 
more neurotic people tend to show more anger out in the case of co-occurring 
contempt. Interestingly, people high in Neuroticism do not show their anger out 
when the feeling of anger is accompanied by disgust, but do show more anger 
out when it is accompanied by surprise, sadness, or contempt. 
The Study V extends previous research on the ways in which emotions co-
occurring with anger, and their interactive effects, influence anger expression. 
The results of Study V showed that simultaneously co-occurring emotions 
buffering against anger-in behavior are happiness, surprise, disgust, and dis-
appointment, whereas the anger-out reaction is influenced by fear, happiness, 
disappointment, and irritation. Regarding emotion regulation, Study V showed 
that there are specific interactive effects between momentary emotions and 
personality traits that lead either to the suppression or expression of anger. It 
means that, when a person feels anger together with other emotions, the anger 
behavior depends on the basic personality dispositions of that person. This 
conclusion is implicitly stated in Big Five personality theory, pointing to the 
need to explicitly explore the links between personality and co-occurring 
emotion in influencing anger behavior. For example, although individual diffe-
rences in emotion experience and expression of anger are well-documented, the 
exact interactions between the momentary emotions and personality traits that 
influence anger behavior need further exploration. In this study, to provide new 
insights into individual differences in anger behavior, we examined the role of 
momentary emotion x personality mechanisms in explaining anger-in vs. anger-
out reactions.     
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2. CONCLUSION 
The results presented in the current thesis provide new information about 
emotion processes. An advanced understanding of emotion recognition, expe-
rience, and expression can be helpful in clarifying the exact nature of the 
emotion processes that influence everyday emotional management.  
To sum up, the main conclusions of the dissertation are the following: 
 People have a generalized view of their empathic assessment accuracy 
across the different domains of state-level emotions, trait-level dispo-
sitions (i.e., personality, identity, etc.), and the behavioral intentions of 
their communication partner. This self-rated empathic accuracy, how-
ever, is not related to actual mindreading skills, but is rather a reflection 
of one’s personality traits. Actual mindreading skills measured as objec-
tive performance on emotion recognition and personality assessment are 
rather a reflection of one’s cognitive abilities. Thus, although people are 
motivated to understand others, they often lack insight into their actual 
social competence (Study I).  
 Despite greater life experience, the ability to recognize specific emo-
tions seems to decline with age. The first signs of age differences in 
emotion recognition accuracy emerge already in the 30s, being most 
distinctive for the negative emotions of anger and sadness. The re-
cognition of facial contempt, however, increases until 60 years of age. 
These changes in emotion perception cannot be explained by other 
possible mediators, such as age-related cognitive decline. Although age 
differences in emotion recognition accuracy are now well documented, 
there is still no clear consensus about the mechanisms behind this age 
effect (Study II). 
 It is adaptive to mentally reconstruct one’s emotional experience over 
time. Memories about experienced emotions of sadness, fear, happiness, 
and anger are systematically influenced by factors at both state and trait 
levels, depending on the period of time elapsed. Retrospective emotion 
ratings given at the end of the day are influenced by age and daily 
tiredness – while tiredness generally leads to an exaggeration of nega-
tive emotions, older people tend to view experienced emotions as less 
intense. Retrospective ratings over longer periods of time depend more 
on personality traits – Neuroticism is linked to retrospective exag-
geration of negative emotions, and Extraversion is linked to retro-
spective exaggeration of positive emotions (Study III). Thus, as time 
passes, memories about experienced emotions are still accurate, but 
become more influenced by personality traits.  
 Tiredness, as one of the most frequently reported mental and physio-
logical states, is influenced by mean levels of experienced emotions as 
well as by emotional variability. The more one’s emotions fluctuate 
over time, the more tiredness is felt momentarily as well as over longer 
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periods of time (Study IV). Thus, stability of both positive and negative 
emotions leads to less experience of tiredness. 
 Despite increasing health concerns, older people generally report less 
tiredness, but when they have recently experienced more variable emo-
tions, they report even more tiredness than younger people. This sug-
gests that superior emotional well-being in older adults is achieved by 
reduced exposure to emotionally stressful situations (Study IV). 
 Anger behavior is influenced by co-occurring emotions that are simulta-
neously elicited in situations. Anger, experienced together with disgust 
or sadness, for instance, reduces both anger-in and anger-out reactions 
In the case of co-occurring disappointment, people are more likely to 
direct their anger inwards and less likely to direct it outwards. Co-
occurring fear only reduces the overt expression of anger (Study V). 
 Anger behaviors are also associated with specific interactive effects 
between the experience of momentary emotions and personality traits 
that lead to higher levels of either suppression or expression of anger 
behavior (or both). For example, people high in Neuroticism are less 
likely to engage in anger-in behavior when experiencing disgust, sur-
prise, or irritation alongside anger, but show more anger-out in the case 
of co-occurring contempt.  People tend to hold their anger in less when 
it is accompanied by disgust, but the effect is stronger for people high in 
Conscientiousness. People high in Extraversion show more anger-out 
compared to people low in Extraversion, but the effect is much stronger 
in the case of co-occurring disgust. People high in Openness express 
more anger-out compared to people low in Openness, but that diffe-
rence is reduced in the case of co-occurring contempt. This indicates an 
interaction between personality dispositions and the emotion system 
that clearly shapes behavior in people’s everyday lives (Study V). 
 
 
2.1 The future research directions 
Current dissertation broadens the perspective of emotion research by providing 
further information about individual differences in emotion processes and their 
effects on behavior. A major task for future research is to include and integrate 
the information from inside the person with all kind of contextual information 
and provide theoretical models to interpret the findings including different 
levels of processing (i.e., intrapersonal, behavioral, interpersonal). Also, future 
research could turn more attention to other channels of emotion communication 
in addition to facial expressions, like the gestures and voice. There is growing 
need for further understanding of emotion processing, like affective variability 
in context of clinical and health psychology applications.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  
Emotsioonide kogemine, väljendamine ja äratundmine: 
isiksuseomadused ja vanus kui olulised mõjutegurid 
Emotsioonid loovad igapäevaselt inimeste elule värvingu, iga inimese emotsio-
naalne maailm on ühest küljest unikaalne, kuid samas on oluline mõista üldisi 
seaduspärasusi emotsioonide kogemise, väljendamise ja äratundmise mustrites. 
Kuigi emotsioonide teadusliku uurimise algus ulatub üle-eelmisesse sajandisse, on 
individuaalsete erinevuste mõistmine emotsioonide osas jõudnud teadusuuringute 
fookusesse just viimastel kümnenditel. Käesoleva väitekirja peamiseks uurimis-
küsimuseks on: „Kuidas mõjutavad inimese isiksuseomadused ja vanus emotsioo-
nide kogemist, väljendamist ja teiste inimeste emotsioonide äratundmist?“.  
Töö baseerub järgmistel teooriatel ja lähenemistel: Empaatilise täpsuse uurimis-
suund (empathic accuracy approach; Ickes, 1997, 2003); Põhiemotsioonide 
teooria (basic emotions theory; Ekman, 1992); Afekti variatiivsuse kontsept-
sioon (affect variability concept; Eid & Diener, 1999); Emotsioonide enese-
kohaste hinnangute ligipääsetavuse mudel (the accessibility model of emotional 
self-report; Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Uurimustöö raames viidi läbi kaks eksperimenti, esimeses käsitleti indivi-
duaalseid erinevusi emotsioonide äratundmises (Uurimus I ja II). Teises eksperi-
mendis olid vaatluse all individuaalsed erinevused emotsioonide kogemises ja 
väljendamises, kasutades kogemuse väljavõtte meetodit (Uurimus III, IV, V).  
Väitekirja põhijäreldused on järgmised:  
 Inimestel on üsnagi selge ja üldistunud arusaam sellest, kui hästi suu-
detakse teise inimese seisundeid ja omadusi hinnata. Kuid see enese-
kohane hinnang oma inimesetundmise võimele ei ole seotud tegeliku 
sooritusega emotsioonide või isiksuseomaduste hindamisel (empathic 
accuracy), peegeldades pigem inimese isiksuseomadusi. Samas kui 
tegelik sooritus on seotud pigem vaimse võimekusega. Seega, kuigi ini-
mesed on motiveeritud teisi inimesi mõistma, pidades sellist sotsiaalset 
kompetentsust oluliseks, ei ole sellised enesekohased hinnangud täpsed. 
Põhjused võivad peituda nii motivatsioonilistes tegurites kui ka vastava 
tagasiside puudumises (Uurimus I) 
 Vaatamata suuremale elukogemusele, tunnevad vanemad inimesed tea-
tud negatiivseid emotsioone (eriti viha ja kurbust) halvemini ära, ning 
selline muutus on täheldatav juba 30-ndates eluaastates. Samas kui 
näiteks põlguse väljenduse äratundmine isegi tõuseb 60ndate eluaasta-
teni. Selliseid vanuselisi muutusi ei saa ära seletada nt vanusega kaasne-
va üldise kognitiivsete võimete langusega ega ka sotsio-emotsionaalse 
selektiivsuse teooriaga (Carstensen et al., 1999). Kuigi vanuselised eri-
nevused emotsioonide äratundmise täpsuses on praeguseks dokumen-
teeritud mitmetes uurimustest, puudub uurijate vahel konsensus selle 
võimalike mehhanismide osas. (Uurimus II) 
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 Inimeste emotsionaalne maailm seisneb paljuski kogetud emotsionaal-
sete hetkede taasloomises, mis soodustab toimetulekut ja toetab emot-
sioonide regulatsiooni. Uurimus III näitas, et kurbuse, hirmu, rõõmu ja 
viha kogemise mäletamine sõltub olenevalt möödaläinud ajast nii ini-
mese hetke väsimusest kui ka isiksuseomadustest ja vanusest. Päeva 
lõpus antud retrospektiivsed hinnangud kogetud emotsioonidele sõltu-
vad eelkõige hindaja vanusest ja väsimusest – väsimus soodustab nega-
tiivsete emotsioonide tugevamaks hindamist, samas kui vanemad inime-
sed hindavad kogetud emotsioone tagantjärele pigem vähem tugevateks. 
Üle kahe nädala antud retrospektiivsed hinnangud on seostatavad kõige 
enam isiksuseomadustega – neurootilisus on seotud negatiivsete emot-
sioonidele subjektiivse intensiivistamisega, ekstravertsus jällegi koge-
tud positiivsete emotsioonide tugevamaks hindamisega.  
 Väsimus on sageli kogetav vaimne seisund, mida mõjutavad nii kogetud 
emotsioonid kui ka nende varieeruvus. Mida enam emotsioonid kõigu-
vad, seda suuremat väsimust inimesed raporteerivad nii momendihin-
nangutes kui ka pikemate perioodide lõikes. Seega kinnitas uurimus, et 
väsimuse seisukohalt võttes on parem hoida emotsioone stabiilsena. 
(Uurimus IV)  
 Varasemad uurimused on leidnud, et vaatamata tervisega seotud mu-
rede suurenemisele, raporteerivad vanemad inimesed vähem subjektiiv-
set väsimustunnet. Uurimus IV kinnitas seda seaduspärasust, kuid üht-
lasi selgus, et juhul kui vanemad inimesed on hiljuti kogenud rohkem 
varieeruvaid emotsioone, siis raporteerivad nad rohkem väsimust kui 
noored inimesed. Seega, järeldub antud uurimusest, et parem vanemate 
inimeste parem emotsionaalne heaolu on saavutatud läbi parema situat-
sioonide valiku – osatakse paremini hoiduda tugevaid emotsioone 
tekitavatest olukordadest. 
 Sageli kogevad inimesed reaktsioonina mingile situatsioonile mitut 
emotsiooni korraga. Viha kogemisel surutakse viha alla või näidatakse 
seda välja ning see sõltub nii kaasuvatest emotsioonidest kui ka 
isiksuseomadustest. Näiteks kui lisaks vihale on inimene ka pettunud 
või hirmunud, näidatakse viha vähem välja. Lisaks esineb interaktiivne 
seos isiksuseomaduste ja kaasuvate emotsioonide vahel vihakäitumise 
seletamisel. See tähendab, et viha allasurumine või väljanäitamine sõl-
tub korraga nii mingist isiksuseomadusest kui ka olukorra poolt lisaks 
vihale tekkinud kaasuvast emotsioonist. Erinevad isiksuseomadused 
interakteeruvad erinevate kaasuvate emotsioonidega. Näiteks neuroo-
tilisemad inimesed ei püüa oma viha väga alla suruda juhul kui sellega 
kaasnevad vastikus või üllatus, kaasuva põlguse korral aga otseselt 
väljendavad enam viha. Seega, andis antud uurimus panuse isiksuse-
omaduste ja emotsioonide süstemaatilise koostoimimise kohta igapäeva 
elus. (Uurimus V) 
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